History and Power in the Study of Law by June Starr Jane F. Collier

Author:June Starr, Jane F. Collier [June Starr, Jane F. Collier]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781501728129
Barnesnoble:
Publisher: Cornell University Press
Published: 2018-08-15T00:00:00+00:00

Conclusion

This chapter represents an attempt to think about “interests.” The purpose is twofold: to explore an aspect of the social matrix of European Community legislative processes, and to lay part of the groundwork for subsequently mapping the bargains (see Strange 1982) that made up the sheepmeat regime. I have concentrated especially on the relationship between structures and interests. Structures, in the sense in which I have used the word here, are simultaneously representations of previous outcomes as well as frameworks, influences, and sometimes determinants of continuing conflicts and compromises. They do not necessarily determine interests, and neither are they the only factors that shape or create interests. Moreover, in the European Community as elsewhere, patterns of lawmaking concerning different issues may vary substantially (see Keohane and Nye 1975:395–406; H. Wallace 1983:53). Nevertheless, this discussion suggests several conclusions concerning how we must approach the subject of “interests” in relation to the lawmaking process.

First, interests must be analyzed neither as antecedent to structures nor as entirely distinct in nature from outcomes. Instead, they need to be seen as created, reproduced, and transformed both by structures and by outcomes. These processes occur, for example, by means of various forms of “proceduralization” (Schaffer 1982), which include determination of the schedule, timing, or rhythm according to which issues are considered; determination of the agenda, defining which issues are to be discussed and thus within what range decisions can be made; and determination of the arena, audience, group, or institution that is to influence, transform, or actually make a decision.

Second, our thinking about interests must go beyond the frameworks imposed by concepts of pressure groups, neocorporatist arrangements, or simple class interests. The concept of a pressure group is itself an analytic notion, implicitly if not explicitly part of a pluralist theory of politics. Neocorporatist arrangements are actually designed, in part, to create interests. But neither is it sufficient to posit the existence of subjective class interests that derive directly and solely from objective relations of production. Instead, interests must be analyzed in a relational context, one that recognizes the dialectical connection between objective and subjective interests.

Third, thinking about “interests” is another way of thinking about power. In delimiting different types of interests, it is necessary always to bear in mind the three faces of power (Lukes 1974). These different faces of power embody different types of interests. In this context, interests are understood as a stake, a concern, an involvement, or a necessarily or potentially affected relation. Power is often considered as shaping interests, which simultaneously influence the exercise of power. But in addition, as I have tried to show, “power” is in some senses merely another word for “interest,” while an interest often amounts to a form of power.

Finally, the interrelationship of structures, outcomes, and interests needs to be understood at different levels of analysis and at different levels of abstraction. For example, structures help to create interests at the individual, organizational, and societal levels. States, law, and the marketing chain thus established, modified, and shaped various interests in the making of the European Community’s sheepmeat regime.

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